The bill that was rushed through parliament this week to ban “hate groups” was clearly well intended. After the terror attack at Bondi Beach, something had to be done. But not like this.
Good intentions are not enough to justify abandoning the principles of good lawmaking that ensure even the most contentious statutes can withstand a determined challenge.
When laws are enacted in a rush, without sufficient scrutiny, the risk of bypassing those principles grows. So does the risk that even the most desirable of statutes will be struck down. That seems to have been forgotten in this week’s scramble to enact a scheme that makes it possible to rid this country of Islamic hate groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir.
The goal is worthy. But the law itself, which was changed several times during the week, still retains a mechanism that excludes judicial oversight and natural justice but includes elements of retrospectivity.
The Law Council warned about these features of the scheme when it was first made public. It was not trying to derail the scheme. It was trying to make it stronger.
It should therefore come as no surprise that Hizb ut-Tahrir has given notice that its lawyers plan to challenge the hate group statute in the High Court. This was entirely predictable. But there is another issue here: even if the hate groups law survives the coming challenge, it is simply unfair.
When it comes to criminal laws – like the hate groups law – the orthodox approach is that parliament makes the law and courts, not politicians, apply the law and punish wrongdoers. The problem is that the bill that has just been approved by parliament gives a government minister, not a court, the power to decide if “conduct constituting a hate crime” has taken place – the main trigger for a banning order.
The definition of a hate crime in this statute is extensive. But the point to keep in mind is it includes conduct that was not a hate crime when it took place. In other words, past odious conduct that was lawful at the time has been redefined retrospectively to be “conduct constituting a hate crime”.
That’s not the only aspect of this scheme that looks questionable. The power to issue banning orders is vested in the minister responsible for the Australian Federal Police, who needs to consider advice from the head of ASIO and obtain the agreement of the Attorney-General.
The legislation makes it clear that “a person does not need to have been convicted of a hate crime in order for the AFP minister to be satisfied an organisation has engaged in” conduct constituting a hate crime.
Procedural fairness has been excluded which means the AFP minister can determine that people have engaged in conduct constituting hate crimes without hearing their side of the story.
Ministerial bans can be reviewed by parliament’s joint standing committee on intelligence and security, and if parliament disagrees with the ban, it can be overturned.
The issue, therefore, is not whether there are enough checks and balances. There clearly are. The issue is whether the High Court will characterise this law as improperly vesting the executive branch of government with powers that are punitive and therefore part of the judicial function.
It might be possible to argue that this procedure is merely a regulated exercise of ministerial discretion that does not directly punish any individual. The complicating factor is that a ministerial ban can indirectly lead to criminal liability.
Those who direct banned hate groups can be jailed for 15 years as can those who recruit new members or retain their membership in these organisations while knowing they have been banned.
Recent history is full of cases in which the High Court has struck down laws that, in the court’s view, encroached upon the judicial function. So why tempt fate when a few changes could have eliminated the risk that the hate group law might go the same way as the notorious migration cases known as NZYQ and YBFZ?
The common factor in both those rulings was the fact that parliament had enacted laws that, in the High Court’s view, handed ministers punitive powers.
In the first case, unlawful non-citizens were freed from indefinite immigration detention. In the second case, a law requiring them to wear ankle bracelets and adhere to curfews was struck down.
In the light of those decisions, it is unfortunate that greater attention was not given to the Law Council’s warning on January 15: “The Law Council would strongly prefer that there be judicial oversight of proscription frameworks in light of the serious criminal consequences for individuals that flow from listing”.
“Consideration should be given to developing an appropriate mechanism for the judicial confirmation of listing proposals,” the Law Council said in a submission to the inquiry into the original version of the government’s bill.
It emerged during that inquiry that before the bill was made public, stakeholders were subjected to extreme restrictions during consultations over what the government had in mind.
The minority report from that inquiry states some stakeholders were permitted only to read selected provisions and were not provided with copies of the bill to take away.
It also reveals that non-government members of parliament and almost all external stakeholders were only provided with the final exposure draft on January 13, one day before the inquiry’s hearings and one week before the government said it intended to pass the bill.