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Chris Merritt
Legal Affairs Contributor
21 August, 2026
How one judge perceives the great public policy issue of our time

The best judges control their rhetoric. Their judgments cover only those matters that are essential to decide the issue before them – no more and no less.

This practice can be frustrating for lawyers who would dearly like to know what individual judges think on all manner of contentious matters.

Judge shopping would be so much easier. So in order to address that risk most judges, but not all, show self-restraint and focus only on matters that are necessary to resolve particular disputes.

That is why every prosecutor and defence lawyer in NSW will be extremely grateful for an extraordinary Supreme Court ruling that was made public this week.

It provides a rare insight into how one judge perceives the great public policy issue of our time: antisemitism and hatred of Israel.

This ruling determined that Mohammed Farhat should not be subject to an extended supervision order when he completes his prison sentence for offences committed in a Jewish suburb of Sydney.

Farhat, who has a Hezbollah tattoo on his neck, burned a car and vandalised property with anti-Israel slogans.

His fate, however, is nowhere near as important as the insight the written judgment in his case has provided into the thinking of Justice Desmond Fagan.

Everyone now knows that Justice Fagan believes it is “understandable” for people of Lebanese Shia heritage to have sympathy for Hezbollah – which is, by the way, a listed terrorist organisation.

That zinger is to be found at paragraph 161 of the judge’s reasons in the case formally known as State of NSW v Farhat (final).

Here’s the full reference: “Whatever the judgment others might make of right and wrong in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, it is understandable that people of Lebanese Shia Muslim heritage would follow closely the military conflict that commenced in late September 2024 and that they would have sympathy for Hezbollah.”

Yes, you read that correctly. This judge believes it is understandable that people will sympathise with Hezbollah if they are Shia Muslims with a Lebanese heritage. That’s just the beginning.

At paragraph 116 the judge pre-empts the International Court of Justice and refers in passing to “Israel’s genocide of the Gazans”.

The full reference is: “It may be reasonably inferred that the results of polling Australian respondents reflect humanitarian reaction to Israel’s genocide of the Gazans sinced 7 October 2023.”

To be clear, South Africa’s accusation of genocide is still before the ICJ, the only tribunal empowered to decide this question under the Genocide Convention.

There has been no finding on the merits of South Africa’s assertion – a point that has been made clear by the ICJ itself.

On January 26, 2024, the ICJ issued a provisional order in that case which says, at paragraph 30: “At the present stage of the proceedings, the court is not required to ascertain whether any violations of Israel’s obligations under the Genocide Convention have occurred.”

The judge’s reference to “Israel’s genocide” contains a footnote, not to a ruling by a court but to a “conference room paper” by a commission of inquiry for the UN Human Rights Council.

If anyone takes the trouble to look up the members of that commission of inquiry they will find that its chairman was Navi Pillay from South Africa – the same country that has proceedings outstanding against Israel in the ICJ.

Pillay retired as chairman of that commission in November 2025 – just after the paper criticising Israel was published in September 2025.

It’s surprising that Pillay, a former judge of South Africa’s High Court, did not retire earlier, before her commission involved itself in a dispute that her country’s government was prosecuting in a different forum.

Far more surprising is that anyone in this country would place any credence on a paper produced in such circumstances. Yet there it is – footnoted in a judgment of the NSW Supreme Court.

There’s another point about Fagan’s judgment that deserves scrutiny.

At paragraph 106, he reproduces part of the definition of antisemitism that has been drawn up by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and proceeds to denounce it.

He writes that the drafting is “inept” and “the core text is verbose and imprecise”. It is, he writes at paragraph 113, “a parasitic rejection of protest against Israel”.

At paragraph 114 he says many submissions to a Senate committee “criticised the IHRA definition on the ground that it conflates political criticism of Israel with antisemitism”.

The first aspect of this that is worth pointing out is that the IHRA definition received only a passing mention by an expert witness and the judge recognised, at paragraph 117, that the crown’s case did not tender that definition.

Yet he kept pointing out that criticism of Israel is not antisemitism. Unfortunately, he was pushing at an open door.

Had he reproduced the full IHRA definition, instead of an extract, he would have seen that it has a carve-out that makes the point that orthodox criticism of Israel is not antisemitic.

But the definition makes it clear that the line is crossed into antisemitism when that criticism denies the Jewish people the right to self-determination by claiming the existence of the state of Israel is a racist endeavour.

It’s unfortunate that the carve-out was not included. Here’s what it says: “However, criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”

The full judgment in this case is illuminating.