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Chris Merritt
Legal Affairs Contributor
28 August, 2026
Loopy human rights bills are constitutional nonsense

Renewed moves are under way federally and in NSW to create statutory charters of rights. With luck, both schemes are destined for oblivion.

They are, however, still worth examining – if only to expose their loopiness.

The NSW Human Rights Bill, introduced last October by the Greens’ Jenny Leong, would legitimise restrictions on fundamental rights that go beyond those permitted by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The federal Human Rights Bill, introduced in May by independent Andrew Wilkie, is best described as a bid to diminish the nation’s parliaments.

Neither scheme is backed by the respective governments yet at this stage neither is cleary opposed by those governments.

The Greens’ Bill is bad. But the Wilkie scheme is worse.

Wilkie’s charter contains provisions that mean “any law” of the Commonwealth, the states or territories that is inconsistent with the proposed charter would have no force or effect to the extent of any inconsistency.

This is constitutional nonsense.

The High Court might take a dim view of Wilkie’s attempt to have his charter – which would be an ordinary act of federal parliament – prevail over every subsequent ordinary act of federal parliament.

It does contain an over-ride mechanism that permits governments to declare their laws operate notwithstanding an adverse charter ruling, but that over-ride would expire after two years.

So if a government disagreed with an adverse ruling under the charter and wanted a law to remain in force, that would require a fresh over-ride declaration every two years for eternity.

The Greens’ proposal in NSW takes a different tack. It would create a system in which it would be unlawful for public authorities to breach the human rights outlined in the charter.

That includes novel rights such as a right to a healthy environment, a right to dignified treatment, a right to emergency medical treatment that is immediately necessary, a right to an adequate living standard including clothing and housing and a right to nutritionally safe food.

This raises the possibility that significant public policy and welfare questions could be determined not by parliament but by the courts and a new human rights commission.

Both Bills should be opposed for the same reason: they are based on the assumption there is something wrong with parliament and the doctrine of responsible government – the idea that lies at the heart of Australian democracy.

This is part of the same malaise that has damaged democracy in the United Kingdom. These Bills would erode the authority of parliament by allocating power to institutions that are beyond the reach of voters: the judiciary and statutory commissions.

One of the great misconceptions about charters of rights is that they are ordinary statutes.

Their supporters argue that because they are not constitutionalised Bills of Rights they present no threat to our system of government. They can, as their advocates tell us, be amended, repealed and if necessary, over-ridden by parliament.

But charters are not normal laws. They are aberrant.

Normal laws are characterised by precise drafting to minimise the risk they may be applied in circumstances not foreseen by parliament.

Charters do the reverse. They avoid precision and are expressed in broad terms that might sound wonderful but mean nothing until they are applied by judges and human rights commissions to specific circumstances.

Consider the right to health. Under clause 39(2) of the NSW Bill every individual “has the right to emergency treatment that is immediately necessary”.

But what does that mean? Would it oblige NSW to provide an emergency clinic in every suburb? Or in every town? Or merely in every region?

Those questions would require a judge or lawyers at the proposed human rights commission to decide whether decisions on those issues breach the right to health.

And to decide such a question they would use criteria that are so vague as to be verging on the subjective.

The right to health, along with most other rights in the Greens’ charter could be subjected to “reasonable” limits that are “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.

So what does that mean? We may as well ask how long is a piece of string?

A different problem arises with the way the Greens’ charter departs from international standards when it comes to religion.

Under Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, no restrictions are allowed on the freedom to have or adopt a religion. It’s an absolute right.

But clause 22 of the Greens Bill includes a note that means restrictions can be imposed on everyone’s right to adopt a religion of their choice.

How long would it be before that led to demands from certain quarters for laws punishing those who switch religions?

The thing to keep in mind about human rights is they frequently come into conflict. And when they do, someone has to decide which right prevails, or what a compromise looks like.

Drawing boundaries between conflicting rights and allocating limited state resources is a political function that is uniquely suited to parliaments, not courts.

Parliaments consider the views of a range of stakeholders and design laws that strike a balance in the broader public interest.

Courts and human rights commissions, by contrast, make decisions based on the single case before them. They do not consider the full range of factors that are part of democratic law-making.

Chris Merritt is vice-president of the Rule of Law Institute of Australia. This article is based on a paper delivered at last weekend’s conference of the Samuel Griffith Society that can be found here: https://ruleoflawaustralia.com.au/commentary/the-push-for-a-human-rights-act-in-australia/