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Chris Merritt
Legal Affairs Contributor
5 February, 2026
NSW Chief Justice critical of Tony Abbott over ‘misconceived’ bridge protest claims

It’s rare for the Chief Justice of NSW to bucket a former prime minister. Yet that is what happened on Thursday evening when the normally affable Andrew Bell gave Tony Abbott a piece of his mind.

At the heart of this row is the question of who was responsible for the now notorious closure of the Sydney Harbour Bridge for a march by anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian protesters.

Bell is annoyed that Abbott blamed the judiciary for allowing the bridge protest and said so on social media soon after the August 2 ruling by Belinda Rigg who had been sworn in as a judge nine days earlier.

The Chief Justice told Thursday’s dinner marking the new law term that Abbott’s criticism was “with respect, misconceived”.

That might seem like a relatively mild rebuke. But it was just the start of what must be one of the most pointed and extended take-downs ever unleashed on a public figure by a senior member of the judiciary.

Bell’s killer point is that Rigg did not make the decision to close the Harbour Bridge.

State authorities had already decided to do that, regardless of the judge’s decision and this had twice been noted in her judgement.

Abbott was clearly mistaken – but he was not alone. And for that we can thank the unbelievable judicial history of the law Rigg was bound to apply.

This is what the former prime minister said: “It should not be for judges to decide when a political protest is justified. The decision to close the Sydney Harbour Bridge to facilitate this protest is a political decision and should be made by elected and accountable ministers – who as it happens, think the march should not go ahead. We are on a slippery slope when unelected judges start making political judgments.”

Bell accepted that judicial decisions should not be free from scrutiny and criticism, but he was concerned about attacks that “betray an ignorance of the statutory framework for the decision and, in many cases, an ignorance of the judge’s reasoning”.

“Such attacks, often dashed ‘off the cuff’, are a form of misinformation that undermines trust in and respect for the judiciary and the rule of law,” Bell said.

“They corrosively suggest or imply that the community cannot have confidence that the judiciary is independent and that judges are not conscientiously and in good faith endeavouring to do their jobs consistent with their judicial oaths.

“That is regrettable to say the least. Some might call it irresponsible.

“I should note in this context that two judges of the Supreme Court who have been the subject of highly personalised and misconceived criticism in some sections of the media for particular decisions have received death threats in the last 18 months. This is obviously of grave concern.

“Respect is called for and part of that respect involves people who would exercise their right to criticise judicial decisions ensuring that they understand the evidence and legal context before they dash off misconceived criticism,” Bell said.

It needs to be recorded that the Chief Justice invoked this writer’s assessment of the Harbour Bridge decision, published in The Australian on August 8, to support his case that Abbott’s comment on social media was misconceived.

That article made no mention of the former prime minister. But I made the point that because the organiser of the bridge march gave police at least seven days notice of the protest, the takeover of this national icon was automatically “authorised” – unless Rigg ruled otherwise.

Yet even if she had ruled against the protest organisers and issued a “prohibition” order, it would have made no difference. The march would still have gone ahead, which is made clear in her judgment.

All that would have happened is that the participants would have been stripped of a limited immunity from prosecution for some offences dealing with crowd and traffic control.

This was because Rigg was following precedent.

The problem is that the statutory provision at the heart of her decision had been interpreteted in those past decisions in a way that must now be considered to be wrong.

Section 25 of the Summary Offences Act says “prohibition” orders can be issued against street marches. But this, bizarrely, has been interpreted in past cases as meaning that a street march could still proceed.

Thankfully, that changed on October 9 when Bell and two other judges on the Court of Appeal prevented anti-Israel and pro-Palestine protesters from occupying the forecourt of the Opera House.

Their ruling made it clear that when section 25 says a “prohibition” order can be issued against a street march, it means what it says.

From that day forward, those who defy prohibition orders risk being prosecuted for contempt.

It had been obvious for months that the statute governing street protests had been interpreted in a way that did not accord with the ordinary meaning of the word “prohibition” that had been chosen by parliament.

Parliament could have fixed that at any time.

The takeover of the Harbour Bridge capped two bleak years in which this flawed understanding of the law coincided with the glorification of mass murder and the incitement of racial hatred.

Abbott was right to be concerned. If he fell into error it was understandable. Until October 9, when Bell insisted on a common sense approach, the law governing street marches was utterly confusing. The word “prohibition” had been rendered meaningless.