When NSW Premier Chris Minns held back from outlawing calls to “globalise the intifada” he explained he wanted to see if a similar law in Queensland would survive a High Court challenge.
That was a mistake. And the reason? The Queensland law is a dud.
The Queensland law is far less robust than the NSW plan to outlaw this phrase that was drawn up in January by state parliament’s Law and Safety Committee.
The NSW plan reflects some, but not all, of the ideas of constitutional lawyer Anne Twomey and therefore stands a better chance of surviving a High Court challenge than the poorly drafted law that has been enacted in Queensland.
The intentions of the Queensland government were admirable. “Globalise the intifada” is a form of words that incites violence and other unlawful conduct against Jews everywhere – including those in Australia.
It deserves to be outlawed in line with the normal practice of criminalising the incitement of violence. Arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
The Queensland government dropped the ball when it came to turning good intentions into a statute that would survive a challenge.
That challenge has now been foreshadowed and it will be based, like a series of other challenges to laws restricting anti-Jewish and anti-Israel protests, on the implied constitutional freedom of political communication.
The Queensland ban, now incorporated in the state’s Criminal Code as section 52DA, lacks some of the elements the High Court would consider to be essential for laws that comply with the implied freedom. It is destined to be struck down.
Regardless of what happens in Queensland, “globalise the intifada” needs to be outlawed in NSW. And the report of that parliamentary committee shows how it could be done.
It called for the chanting of the phrase in a public place to be made unlawful when it is linked to material harm, such as incitement of hatred or harassment, intimidation or violence.
Twomey’s submission to the NSW committee warned against prohibiting particular political communications based on their content, such as particular political chants or slogans.
But she then said such a law would be at greater risk of invalidity than a law directed at the harmful impact of certain phrases – such as slogans that a reasonable person would consider are likely to cause serious community discord, intimidation or violence.
The NSW committee accepted the second part of Twomey’s proposal: it wants to ban “globalise the intifada” but only when it is linked to the incitement of harm.
That link to incitement of harm is crucial and there is no equivalent in the Queensland law. It explains why the NSW committee only recommended banning “globalise the intifada” and not “from the river to the sea”.
“The committee recognises the importance of legitimate political expression and does not recommend proscribing other phrases that are nonviolent expressions of Palestinian solidarity, even if they may be offensive to some people,” it said.
Its report says “the term ‘intifada’ cannot be separated from its history of violence against Jewish people”.
“We believe that the use of this phrase may directly inspire the kind of violence associated with its history,” its report says.
The Queensland law shows no such recognition that the High Court will, inevitably, have the final say.
The Queensland law bans both phrases, ignores the requirement for incitement and uses a test for liability that is so imprecise it is incapable of being known in advance.
The best thing that can be said about the Queensland law is that it is better than the original plan which would have given a government minister the power to expand, by regulation, the category of criminally prohibited speech without parliamentary oversight.
Thankfully, that was dumped.
The Queensland law, which now forms section 52DA of the Criminal Code, targets anyone who “recites, distributes or publicly displays” the prohibited expressions “globalise the intifada” and “from the river to the sea”.
It imposes up to two years’ jail for those who use these terms “in a way that might reasonably be expected to cause a member of the public to feel menaced harassed or offended”.
The most significant aspect of this law is what it does not contain.
There is no need to prove an intent to threaten, harass or vilify. There is no need to prove incitement of violence or hatred, and there is no need to prove that anyone suffered any harm.
In 2004 in an implied freedom case known as Coleman v Power, the High Court pointed to the importance of incitement in a public order speech offence in Queensland.
Other problems were pointed out in February when section 52DA was being considered by the Queensland parliament’s Justice, Integrity and Community Safety Committee.
The Christian think tank, Freedom for Faith, told that committee the test for liability was not the same as the well known “reasonable person” test.
“The test requires only that there is a reasonable expectation that a ‘member of the public’ might feel menaced, harassed or offended,” Freedom for Faith told the committee.
“That member of the public need not be reasonable or reflect common social norms.
“They may hold very strong views on such issues and be easily offended. The test only requires that it might be reasonably expected that such a person might feel offended.”
From a rule of law perspective, section 52DA is bad law. People can be jailed for breaching an imprecise test that is incapable of being known in advance.


