In a perfect world, Virginia Bell’s royal commission into anti-semitism and social cohesion would be assessed on its findings and recommendations.
But that will not be possible unless the commission abandons its over-use of secrecy and reveals a suppressed section of the interim report it released in April.
This is not a minor issue. It goes to the heart of what this commission was supposed to investigate: whether counter-terrorism officers at the Australian Federal Police have enough resources to do their work.
The commission’s letters patent require Bell to determine whether law enforcement and security agencies “have sufficient powers and resources to respond to anti-semitic conduct”.
She was required to reach a conclusion on the AFP’s resourcing but she has not shared it with the community.
The issue was covered in the interim report but her conclusion, if it exists, is in a secret edition of that interim report report that was distributed to federal and state governments.
Unless the commissioner changes her mind, the federal and NSW parliaments may never be told whether there were sufficient resources available to the counter-terrorism officers at the AFP before the deadly attack at Bondi Beach on December 14 last year.
That makes a mockery of the doctrine of responsible government.
The executive branch – ministers and agencies such as the AFP – are responsible to parliament for their actions.
Parliament needs to know if this royal commission has concluded that one of the most important weapons in the fight against anti-semitic terrorism was under-resourced when it was needed most.
Even though the commission bowdlerised the public version of the interim report, it provides enough information to raise a suspicion that something went dreadfully wrong at a time of great peril.
That period began on October 7, 2023, when Hamas attacked Israel, and reached a deadly climax with the massacre at Bondi Beach.
The public version of the interim report says “the AFP’s counter-terrorism resourcing, in terms of both budget and average staffing levels, has remained relatively stable over recent years”.
Here’s what Bell did not say in the public version of the interim report: stable resourcing at a time of growing demand for police work amounts to a cut in real terms.
But she did outline aspects of the growing demands placed on counter-terrorism officers during this period.
The logical conclusion – which does not appear in the public version of the interim report – is that the AFP officers who were charged with preventing anti-semitic terrorism were put in an impossible position.
They were confronted with significant growth in anti-semitic threats but were restricted to “relatively stable” resourcing in terms of budget and staff.
We need to know if those on the front line in the fight against terrorism were starved of resources.
The public version of the interim report says its additional conclusions on the subject of resourcing are in the confidential version.
It would be startling if that secret edition of the interim report fails to connect the dots and conclude that the workload outstripped the resources that were available for counter-terrorism.
If that is what the secret version of the interim report says, we also need to know if the commission considered who was responsible.
Here is just some of the increased workload, outlined in Bell’s interim report, that confronted counter-terrorism officers after October 7:
- Operation Larimar was established in October, 2023 – the same month as the Hamas attack – in order to protect the community from politically motivated violence and terrorism.
- Also in October, 2023, the AFP expanded the role of its community liaison teams to increase engagement with peak Jewish organisations.
- Operation Ardvarna was established in October, 2024, to investigate complaints of publicly displaying symbols in Victoria potentially inciting or advocating violence or hatred based on race and religion.
- Operation Avalite was established with ASIO in December, 2024, to investigate threats, violence and hatred against Jews and members of parliament.
- In October last year Operation Avalite was folded into three national security teams that were established to target groups causing harm to social cohesion.
At the time of the Bondi attack Avalite had 161 current investigations.
The commission’s final report, due in December, will be the last chance for Bell to make public her full assessment of the impact this growth in terrorism-related work had on the AFP’s relatively stable resources.
That would not require her to disclose details of operational matters nor would it mean compromising national security or prejudicing criminal proceedings.
All she needs to do is provide a bottom-line conclusion: was there a capability gap due to the agency’s “relatively stable” resourcing at a time when the threat of anti-semitic terrorism was clear and growing?
This could be done while continuing to adhere to the principles that prompted Bell to produce the secret edition of the interim report.
On April 30, when she provided the interim report to Governor-General Sam Mostyn, her letter to Mostyn focused on the need to protect confidential national security information.
That, of course, is legitimate.
The interim report itself says parts of every chapter are contained only in the confidential version “for reasons that include national security and the need to avoid prejudice to current criminal proceedings”.
Again, that makes sense.
But it is difficult to see how those principles justify the suppression of the commission’s asessment of whether the counter-terrorism work of the AFP was sufficiently resourced to cope with the growing terror threat. Parliament needs to know.


