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Chris Merritt
Legal Affairs Contributor
9 April, 2026
Justice system on trial as Ben Roberts-Smith faces historic war crime charges

This country needs to come to terms with the fact that there is a real risk that Ben Roberts-Smith will not be given a fair trial.

This would be the worst possible outcome – far worse than having a decorated former soldier convicted on five charges of war crime murder.

If we cannot provide a fair trial for Roberts-Smith it would shake confidence in the justice system and send a terrible signal to those in the military as well as potential recruits.

That outcome is not inevitable. But the judge who presides over his trial will face an immense task in ensuring it does not lead to injustice.

The risk arises from two factors: the extreme delay in bringing charges over what Roberts-Smith is alleged to have done in Afghanistan, and the unprecedented volume of prejudicial media coverage.

This points to potential problems with two of the most important elements of criminal justice: witness accounts about historic events that could be unreliable and a jury pool that could be fatally biased.

On jury bias, the judge will almost certainly instruct the jury to ignore everything they have read or heard in the media and to consider only what they hear in court.

That task has been made more difficult by statements by public figures who must have forgotten the difference between a proven fact and an allegation.

After Paul Brereton’s inquiry into war crime allegations in Afghanistan, and before anyone had been charged let alone convicted, the then head of the defence force, Angus Campbell, apologised to the people of that country.

If Roberts-Smith tries to avoid the risk of jury bias by seeking a judge-alone trial, he will be stymied by section 80 of the Constitution which says federal indictable offences – which includes war crimes – must be heard by a jury.

Roberts-Smith, therefore, will not be granted the same protection against jury bias that was provided to former NSW politician Eddie Obeid and his son Moses, who were subjected to a similar wave of prejudicial media coverage.

The Obeids and fellow defendant Ian Macdonald applied to the Supreme Court and were granted a judge-alone trial because they were charged under NSW law which did not invoke section 80 of the Constitution.

Trial by jury promotes confidence in the justice system. But when there is a clear risk of a biased jury, as there is in this case, the NSW system is a stronger safeguard against injustice.

The second problem for the judge is this: By the time this case comes on for trial witnesses will be giving evidence about events that are alleged to have taken place about twenty years in the past.

Some would have given statements to Brereton’s inquiry, the Office of the Special Investigator, the Nine newspapers that had pursued Roberts-Smith, and to the defamation proceedings he initiated against those newspapers.

They would be familiar with the findings of the Brereton report and Justice Anthony Besanko’s defamation ruling that Nine had proved, on the lower civil standard, the substantial truth of their accusation that Roberts-Smith is a murderer.

They would have repeatedly outlined their recollections. And that is the problem.

Memory does not improve with time. Accounts might become more polished the more often they are told but they are not necessarily more accurate.

Michael McHugh, a former High Court judge, pointed out in 1989 that the longer the period between an event and its recall, the greater the margin for error.

“The fallibility of human recollection and the effect of imagination, prejudice and suggestion on the capacity to ‘remember’ is well documented,” McHugh wrote in his judgement in a case known as Longman.

Jim Spigelman, a former Chief Justice of NSW, took a similar view. He recognised that “suggestibility” gives rise to the most frequent distortions of memory.

“Witnesses can, without any dissimulation or propensity to lie, confidently assert the truth of conversations, observations and events which did not happen,” Spigelman said in a 2011 address on truth and the law.

When Roberts-Smith was arrested this week, it was over events that are alleged to have taken place up to seventeen years ago.

Another SAS veteran, Oliver Shultz, was arrested in 2023 and will face trial next year – which will be fifteen years after the alleged events in his case.

If a similar four-year delay affects the Roberts-Smith trial, his jury will be presented with testimony about events that by then will have taken place twenty-one years in the past.

There is no clear rule on how far judges will allow witnesses to go in attempting to recall what happened in the distant past, but it’s worth considering the view of the late Sir Laurence Street, another former Chief Justice of NSW.

Street conducted a royal commission in 1983 and expressed grave doubts about the reliability of testimony about events that were just five or six years in the past.

“In some cases suspicion underwent subtle change to belief, which itself progressed to reconstruction, which in turn escalated to recollection,” Street wrote.

There is, of course, no suggestion that the witnesses who will give evidence against Shultz and Roberts-Smith are afflicted by such problems.

Nor is there any suggestion that judges are incapable of warning juries to treat testimony with caution – or even extreme caution.

Even so, these cases will take the courts into uncomfortable territory: how can they do justice over events in the distant past where the critical factor is human memory – which is not infallible?