When the High Court takes a step in the wrong direction, the full impact might not be immediately apparent. But consequences eventually pile up until reform becomes inevitable.
That day has finally arrived for one of the court’s worst ideas: 1992’s implied constitutional freedom of political communication.
This doctrine appears nowhere in the written text of the Constitution. It is a judicial creation that changed the balance between parliament and the courts in a way that was never approved by the Australian people.
The implied freedom, therefore, lacks democratic legitimacy. It is also a confused mess.
Thirty-four years after its creation, there is still disagreement within the High Court about whether it should exist and how it should operate.
From a rule of law perspective, that is a sign of failure. All law, particularly constitutional law, must be clear and capable of being known in advance.
One way or another, the High Court needs to engage in some housekeeping: it’s time to either fix the implied freedom or dump it.
For years now, this doctrine has been frustrating attempts – particularly in NSW – to reclaim the public square from those who have intimidated and silenced Jews and anyone else who believes Israel has a right to exist.
The balance set by parliament between the right to protest and the right to be free from intimidation has been second-guessed by NSW courts who are obliged to apply what the High Court says is the law of the Constitution.
This week the cheer squad for this doctrine grew beyond Sydney’s Palestinian-aligned Jew baiters to include former Nazis who have rebranded themselves as the White Australia Party.
Lawyers for this group were in the High Court in Canberra on Tuesday and Wednesday arguing the Albanese government was wrong to ban them. They cited the implied freedom.
While the lawyers debated, puffed up members of this group, formerly known as the National Socialist Network, formed up outside in two lines for the ABC’s cameras. That incident took place 2.4 kilometres from the Australian War Memorial.
Helping white supremacists, former Nazis and Jew baiters is unlikely to have been what the High Court had in mind when it created the implied freedom. But that’s where we are.
This, however, is a symptom of a bigger problem.
Recent judgements suggest there are three different bodies of opinion within the High Court itself about whether the implied freedom should exist and whether its central mechanism – known structured proportionality – is mandatory or merely an optional tool of analysis.
Against this background, it should come as no surprise that one state government believes the time for reform has arrived.
The real surprise is that the state concerned is South Australia, not NSW which has suffered repeated courtroom defeats at the hands of the implied freedom.
South Australia’s intervention in the White Australia case is technical but important. It recognises that the mechanism at the heart of the implied freedom, known as structured proportionality, requires judges to venture into areas of public policy that are none of their business.
South Australia’s legal team, led by Solicitor-General Mike Wait SC, has filed submissions that say the decision in a case known as McCloy that endorsed structured proportionality should be overturned.
That decision, according to Wait, led to “opacity and ambiguity” and this had led to complexity for lower courts and litigants as well as those advising government about legislative proposals.
Wait wrote that one aspect of structured proportionality calls for a value judgement that goes further than judicial evaluation and scrutiny and “invites incursion into the realm of policy preferences”.
On that point, Wait is right on the money.
What business is it of a court to determine whether a law is “suitable” or “adequate in its balance” – which are key elements of structured proportionality.
Under the South Australian proposal, those tests would be dumped.
Under our system of government we elect members of parliament to design laws that are “suitable” and “balanced”. If they fail to do so, we can always elect others.
It would have been gratifying to see South Australia go further and call for the abolition of the entire doctrine – but it was not to be.
Instead, the proposed South Australian version of structured proportionality would be built around a single test of “reasonable necessity”.
That’s an improvement. But it would still mean the High Court would be second-guessing parliament on the question of whether a law is a reasonable necessity.
If, for example, parliament decides that public Jew baiting should be confined to certain places and restricted to certain hours, why is the decision of a court on that issue superior to that of an elected government?
The fatal flaw with the implied freedom is that it rests on an internal inconsistency.
This doctrine, according to the judges who created it, is an implication arising from the text and structure of the Constitution and is intended to protect representative democracy.
Yet in order to defend representative democracy this judicial creation is being used to strike down laws made by parliaments that are elected by the people.
Under the Constitution that was approved at multiple votes around the continent before federation, the protection of rights and the balance between conflicting rights was left to parliament.
Freedom of political communication is a vital liberty. But all rights must be balanced against others. The real question is who should we trust with that work?


